Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform in the Post-Communist Region after 1989: Assessing the Impact of Domestic Politics, International Conditionality, and Economic Development. IHS Political Science Series Paper No. 116, June 2008 by Spendzharova, Aneta B.
116 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft 
Political Science Series 
 
Banking Sector Liberalization and 
Reform in the Post-Communist 
Region after 1989
Assessing the Impact of Domestic Politics, 
International Conditionality, and 
Economic Development
Aneta B. Spendzharova   
116 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft 
Political Science Series 
 
 
 
 
Banking Sector Liberalization and 
Reform in the Post-Communist 
Region after 1989
Assessing the Impact of Domestic Politics, 
International Conditionality, and 
Economic Development
Aneta B. Spendzharova 
 
June 2008 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna  
 
Contact: 
 
Aneta B. Spendzharova 
Department of Political Science 
Institute for Advanced Studies 
Stumpergasse 56 
A-1060 Vienna 
: +43/1/599 91-180 
email: aneta.spendzharova@ihs.ac.at 
 
Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the 
economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian
Federal Ministry of Education, and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the
first institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in
Austria. The Political Science Series presents research done at the Department of Political Science 
and aims to share “work in progress” before formal publication. It includes papers by the Department’s
teaching and research staff, visiting professors, graduate students, visiting fellows, and invited
participants in seminars, workshops, and conferences. As usual, authors bear full responsibility for the
content of their contributions. 
 
 
Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) wurde im Jahr 1963 von zwei prominenten Exilösterreichern –
dem Soziologen Paul F. Lazarsfeld und dem Ökonomen Oskar Morgenstern – mit Hilfe der Ford-
Stiftung, des Österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und der Stadt Wien gegründet und ist
somit die erste nachuniversitäre Lehr- und Forschungsstätte für die Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
wissenschaften in Österreich. Die Reihe Politikwissenschaft bietet Einblick in die Forschungsarbeit 
der Abteilung für Politikwissenschaft und verfolgt das Ziel, abteilungsinterne Diskussionsbeiträge einer
breiteren fachinternen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche Verantwortung für die 
veröffentlichten Beiträge liegt bei den Autoren und Autorinnen. Gastbeiträge werden als solche 
gekennzeichnet. 
  
Abstract 
This paper connects the literature on market liberalization in advanced industrialized 
countries and that on economic reform in transitional countries. It tests three important 
theoretical frameworks in the analysis of policy change—domestic politics, international 
pressures, and economic development—using time-series cross-section analysis of 25 post-
communist states. The findings reveal a complex causal pattern where factors from all three 
theoretical frameworks are substantively important. On the domestic level, curbing corruption 
is strongly related to more banking sector liberalization. The higher the presence of foreign 
banks in the country, the more banking sector liberalization. On the international level, 
exposure to stricter IMF conditionality has a positive effect on the extent of banking sector 
liberalization. The analysis also confirms the salience of structural factors: Measures of 
economic development such as GDP per capita and stock market capitalization are 
important predictors of the extent of banking sector liberalization. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag verbindet die Literatur zur Marktliberalisierung in fortgeschrittenen 
Industriestaaten mit derjenigen zur ökonomischen Reform in Transitionsländern. Dabei 
werden drei wesentliche theoretische Ansätze zur Untersuchung von politischen 
Reformprozessen auf der Grundlage einer kombinierten Quer- und Längsschnitt-
untersuchung von 25 postkommunistischen Staaten empirisch getestet - die Effekte 
nationaler politischer Prozesse, internationale Einflüsse und die Konsequenzen 
ökonomischer Entwicklungen. Die empirischen Befunde untermauern ein komplexes 
Verursachungsmuster, das wesentliche Effekte aller drei Argumente belegt. Auf der Ebene 
der nationalen Politiken tragen Erfolge im Kampf gegen Korruption zur Liberalisierung des 
Bankensektors bei. Je stärker ausländische Banken sich in einem Land engagieren, desto 
tiefgreifender wird dieser Sektor liberalisiert. Auf der internationalen Ebene trägt die strikte 
Konditionalität des IWF zur Liberalisierung des Bankensektors bei. Die Analyse bestätigt 
auch die Bedeutung struktureller Aspekte: Indikatoren der ökonomischen Entwicklung, etwa 
das BIP pro Kopf oder die Kapitalisierung der Aktienmärkte, sind wesentliche Einflussgrößen 
für die Liberalisierung des Bankensektors. 
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Introduction 
Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s, policy-makers in the post-
communist region confronted daunting tasks. The orthodox principles of running a socialist 
planned economy no longer applied. Governments faced the challenge of laying the 
foundations of a market economy: Which economic reforms should be implemented and in 
what order? One important task was to reduce the involvement of the state in the economy 
and create a more pluralistic economic arena. Reforming the banking sector is an essential 
component of economic liberalization and reveals the difficulties of building market 
institutions in transitional countries. This article investigates which political factors are 
conducive to banking sector liberalization and reform using time-series cross-section 
analysis of 25 post-communist states.
1 To measure the extent of banking sector 
liberalization, the analysis employs a score developed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
Scholars of public policy and political economy have examined the move toward market 
liberalization and privatization in advanced industrialized states since the late 1970s in 
economic sectors such as telecommunications, energy, industry, finance, and transport 
(Schmidt 1996; Vogel 1996; Thatcher 2002; Clifton et al. 2006). They have pointed out that 
the state has withdrawn from direct ownership and management of the economy, but as 
Giandomenico Majone (1994) has stressed, “often, deregulation is only a first step towards 
re-regulation, that is, regulation by other means” such as influencing market participants’ 
behavior through economic incentives or regulating at a level of government different from 
the national one. Majone (1994, 1999) has described the rise of the “regulatory state” and, 
more recently, David Levi-Faur and Jacint Jordana (2005) have analyzed the foundations 
and dynamics of “regulatory capitalism.” 
This article connects the literature on market liberalization in advanced industrialized 
countries and that on economic reform in transitional countries. I test the explanatory power 
of three important theoretical frameworks in the analysis of policy change—domestic politics, 
international pressures, and economic development—using time-series cross-section 
analysis of 25 post-communist states. Accounts of economic liberalization and regulatory 
reform in advanced industrialized states have emphasized the importance of two main 
groups of factors and their interplay—endogenous domestic developments and international 
pressures for reform. Thus I first probe the salience of domestic political factors such as the 
political ideology of the governing party or coalition (Swann 1988; Campbell and Pedersen 
                                                       
1 I am grateful to Liesbet Hooghe, Layna Mosley, John Stephens, Milada Vachudova, Georg Vanberg, and members 
of the Comparative Politics Working Group at UNC – Chapel Hill for invaluable comments and suggestions. At the 
IHS – Vienna, I am indebted to Gerda Falkner, Guido Tiemann, and Oliver Treib for their very constructive and 
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2001). Second, international pressures accounts have focused on the external dimension of 
policy reform. Those analyses have shed light on the role of international organizations in 
advocating models of policy reform as well as the dynamics of policy diffusion across states 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Brooks 2005; Elkins and 
Simmons 2005). Third, I test a set of hypotheses derived from the literature on economic 
development and transition that has stressed the significance of structural factors such as a 
country’s level of economic development (Przeworski et al. 2000). This article applies the 
general propositions of the three frameworks to the issue of banking sector liberalization and 
reform in the post communist region. 
How are the incentives for banking sector reform structured in the post-communist region? 
Political actors have certain incentives to pursue reforms that would create a stable and 
efficient banking sector in order to promote economic development. The advantage of a 
reformed banking sector with clear rules of the game is that economic actors can assume 
availability of capital, engage in meaningful long-term planning, and expect prompt servicing 
of their financial accounts (Levine 2002; Barth et al. 2006). Many foreign investors prefer a 
stable political and institutional environment that guarantees property rights and offers 
efficient financial intermediation (Jensen 2003; Henisz and Macher 2004; Biglaiser and 
DeRouen 2006). Domestic businesses seek access to affordable credit in order to develop 
and grow (Marinov and Marinova 2003; Djarova 2004). 
Yet the banking sector also provides fertile ground for political interference and corruption, 
because influential political figures can provide access to loans and preferential financing. 
Political actors face incentives to implement partial banking reforms that maximize their 
discretionary power over the allocation of capital. When the state holds majority stakes in the 
most influential banks, the political agenda of the government can trump the market 
incentives of the banks and the state budget can be used to write off bad loans incurred by 
the banks. Since 1989, a number of incidents have emerged in which influential political and 
economic elites in the region have misused public financial resources (Frye and Shleifer 
1997; Hellman 1998; Ganev 2001; Barnes 2003; Gould 2003). 
The adoption of international benchmark mechanisms can prevent the misuse of the banks. 
Among those mechanisms are laws that promote transparency in bank operations and 
information-sharing concerning large loans; laws that allow the central bank to operate 
independently of political pressure; and institutional mechanisms to monitor the risk 
exposure and compliance of banks with the legal rules. The puzzle animating this article is: 
What political and economic factors push governments to liberalize the banking sector and 
adopt international best practices in banking sector reform? 
This article is organized as follows: Section 1 presents a theoretical discussion of the impact 
of domestic politics, international pressures, and economic development on banking sector 
reform. In section 2, I define the dependent variable in my analysis—the extent of banking I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 3 
sector liberalization and reform—and describe the operationalization of the independent 
variables. Section 3 presents the estimation approach that I use and discusses the results of 
the analysis. In the conclusion I sum up the findings of the article. 4 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S 
1. Theorizing the Influence of Domestic Politics, International 
Conditionality, and Economic Development 
Domestic Politics 
Government Partisanship 
How do domestic political developments, international pressures, and economic 
development influence the course of banking sector liberalization and reform? This section 
provides an overview of the main mechanisms and relevant findings in the three theoretical 
frameworks. To begin with, let us examine the expected effects of government partisanship. 
According to partisan politics accounts, the competition among political parties for office is an 
essential feature of the political process in democratic regimes (Duverger 1954; Blondel 
1968; Sartori 1976). The comparative politics literature on post-communist reform has 
established that liberal/right and reformed communist successor parties in power have 
performed better in the initiation and implementation of market-liberalizing reforms compared 
to their unreformed communist counterparts (Haggard and Webb 1994; Ekiert 1996; Appel 
2000; Bunce 2000; Grzymala-Busse 2002; Vachudova 2005). The following hypotheses 
summarize the expected policy impact of the different types of partisan coloration.  
Hypothesis 1: Liberal/right political parties in power introduce more banking sector 
liberalization than unreformed communist successor parties in power. 
Hypothesis 2: Reformed communist successor parties in power introduce more banking 
sector liberalization than unreformed communist successor parties in power. 
The literature has emphasized two mechanisms that help to explain the association between 
partisanship and the degree of economic liberalization in general. The first dimension is party 
ideology. According to Valerie Bunce (1999), the correlation between the liberal/right 
opposition in power and more economic liberalization can be attributed to the ideological 
foundations of the liberal/right opposition parties in the region. Because they rejected the 
economic policies pursued under communist rule, the opposition parties in most Eastern 
European states have adopted a market-liberalizing economic agenda. The second 
mechanism is political competition. Milada Vachudova (2005) has shown that due to the 
increased quality of political competition, in countries where the right-wing opposition 
defeated the communist incumbents in the first post-1989 elections, the communist 
successor parties were forced to become more transparent, revised significantly their policy 
agenda, and endorsed at least some form of market-liberalizing reforms in order to “get back 
in the political game.” By contrast, unreformed communist successor parties implement I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 5 
limited banking sector reforms that preserve and enhance clientelistic linkages among state 
officials, enterprise managers, and bankers (Hellman 1998; Ganev 2001; Barnes 2003). 
The argument about the salience of partisanship rests on the assumption that political parties 
are key actors in setting public policy. This may be a plausible hypothesis for many advanced 
industrialized countries, but less so for post-communist states. As Herbert Kitschelt (1995: 
448) has pointed out, “the presumption that political conflict between parties is based on 
programmatic appeals is generally problematic for students of non-West-European politics.” 
Petr Kopecky (1995: 517) has demonstrated in his case study of the Czech Republic that 
even in political systems where relatively cohesive and programmatic parties are prevalent, 
political parties are rather insulated from their grass-root citizen supporters. Therefore, we 
need to investigate the influence of other groups such as organized business and economic 
interests on the policy positions of political parties in the region. 
Domestic Stakeholders 
One way to gauge which groups influence the policy positions of political parties is to 
examine the relationship between the governing parties and different types of domestic 
stakeholders. By domestic stakeholders I mean organized groups with a salient political or 
economic policy position such as business associations, labor unions, non-governmental 
organizations, and policy think-tanks. 
A first strategy to understand the impact of those actors focuses on the role of rent-seeking 
domestic stakeholders. Joel Hellman (1998) has argued insightfully that the most significant 
threat to consolidating democracy and market economy in the post-communist region has 
come from a small group of partial reform “winners.” Branislav Slantchev (2005) has 
confirmed statistically this finding. According to Hellman (1998: 204), the main groups that 
have stalled reforms are “enterprise insiders who have become new owners only to strip 
their firms’ assets; commercial bankers who have opposed macroeconomic stabilization to 
preserve their enormously profitable arbitrage opportunities in distorted financial markets; 
local officials who have prevented market entry into their regions to protect their share of 
local monopoly rents; and so-called mafiosi who have undermined the creation of a stable 
legal foundation for the market economy.” Unreformed communist successor parties in 
power preserve and enhance clientelistic linkages among state officials, enterprise 
managers, and bankers inherited from the old regime and tend to limit banking sector 
liberalization and reform (Nenovksy et al. 2003: 6-7). Therefore, I expect that banking sector 
liberalization will be more extensive in political systems with low levels of clientelism and 
corruption. 
Hypothesis 3: The less corruption and clientelism are present in the domestic political 
system, the more banking sector liberalization. 6 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S 
A second strategy to understand the impact of mobilized domestic stakeholders focuses on 
the role of foreign investors. In contrast to the clientelistic alliances forged by unreformed 
communist governing elites, liberal/right and reformed left governments have pursued 
economic reform and growth by establishing domestic alliances with foreign investors and 
export-oriented domestic businesses. Scholars of political economy have found that inflows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) have a positive effect on the economic performance of 
transitional economies in the region (Dunning and Narula 1996; Schröder 2001; Marinov and 
Marinova 2003). FDI provides both physical capital and employment possibilities that may 
not be available in the host market otherwise. Because of its significant benefits, attracting 
FDI has become an integral part of economic development strategies of many developing 
countries (Jensen 2003: 588). 
In what ways may foreign direct investors influence the path of banking sector reform? 
Foreign direct investment is a long-term type of international capital flows, in contrast to 
short-term types such as portfolio investment. The purpose of FDI is to establish lasting 
commercial relations and exert a noticeable managerial influence in the foreign country 
(Barrell and Holland 2000: 478). According to Leslie Lipschitz, Timothy Lane, and Alexandros 
Mourmouras (2002: 4), FDI is unlikely to be withdrawn in response to short-term market 
volatility. If a government can put in place institutional mechanisms that reduce political risk, 
guarantee stable property rights, and ensure efficient financial intermediation, it will attract 
and retain more foreign investment (Jensen 2003: 594; Li and Resnick 2003: 178). The long-
term commitment of FDI investors may motivate them to take an active part in enterprise 
decision-making and press the country’s government for a more transparent and predictable 
business environment, including a more efficient banking sector. 
Hypothesis 4: The stronger the presence of foreign direct investors in the country, the more 
banking sector liberalization. 
A third strategy to understand the policy influence of economic actors refers to a country’s 
pattern of trade and its impact on domestic political institutions. Trade patterns are influenced 
predominantly by considerations about economic efficiency, comparative advantage, and 
production costs. Yet does a country’s trade profile influence banking sector policies? Helen 
Milner (1999: 106) has pointed out that the impact of trade on domestic institutions is most 
visible in organized trade regimes such as the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN. According to Milner 
(1999), when a regional trade regime is deeply institutionalized and has the capacity to 
enforce trade rules, it can demand from its trading partners to comply with “best practices” 
observed by the members of the trade regime, including issues such as banking sector 
liberalization. I use the degree of post-communist countries’ trade orientation toward 
advanced industrialized economies as a proxy for their exposure to the influence of 
international trade regimes. I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 7 
Hypothesis 5: The more a country’s trade is oriented toward advanced industrialized 
economies, the more banking sector liberalization. 
Constitutional Set-up 
This article also tests whether the distinction between parliamentary and presidential 
constitutional-set up has an impact on the extent of banking sector liberalization and reform 
in the post-communist area. Most parliamentary systems in the region have a proportional 
representation electoral system, which is conducive to the formation of coalition 
governments. In turn, coalition governments are less likely to undertake abrupt policy 
reversals (Jensen 2003; Li 2006). By contrast, in presidential post-communist systems such 
as Russia and Kazakhstan, the president has extensive power to shape (even arbitrarily) 
property rights laws, concession contracts, and the extent to which foreign economic actors 
are allowed to operate in the domestic market. In addition, a constitutional set-up that gives 
extensive policy-making powers to the president may hamper banking sector liberalization by 
limiting political competition and the availability of viable political and economic alternatives 
(Hellman 1996: 56; Keefer 2007: 636). 
Hypothesis 6: We expect more banking sector liberalization in parliamentary political 
systems in the post-communist region than in presidential ones. 
International Conditionality 
International organizations such as the European Union (EU), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the World Bank have gained much policy salience. Scholars have 
demonstrated the far-reaching impact of international conditionality on domestic policy-
making (Mayhew 1998; Schmitter 2001; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; 
Vachudova 2005; Grabbe 2006). In the realm of banking sector reform, the IMF has pushed 
for legal provisions that guarantee the independence of the central bank from political 
pressure; open the banking sector to foreign investors and competition; strengthen banking 
supervision; and improve the bankruptcy legal framework (Bonin and Wachtel 1999; Berglöf 
and Bolton 2002). As described in greater detail in Appendix I, I have coded four types of 
exposure to IMF conditionality in the post-communist area: 1) No IMF agreement; 2) Stand-
by agreement; 3) Poverty Relief and Growth Facility; 4) No IMF program and reform front-
runner. In addition, I test the effect of the amount of loans obtained from the IMF. 
Hypothesis 7: We expect countries enrolled in stricter IMF conditionality programs to pursue 
more banking sector liberalization. 8 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S 
Hypothesis 8: We expect countries that owe large amounts to the IMF to pursue more 
banking sector liberalization. 
The EU has also demanded that the post-communist candidate countries comply with the 
banking sector standards of the Union. For credible future members, the specific policy 
demands of EU conditionality in banking are part of the comprehensive and compulsory pre-
accession harmonization with EU law organized into 31 accession chapters. Provisions 
concerning the banking sector feature in the following accession negotiations chapters: 
Economic and Monetary Union, Free Movement of Capital, Freedom to Provide Services, 
Financial Control, and Finance and Budgetary Provisions. As described in greater detail in 
Appendix I, I have coded five levels of EU conditionality in the post-communist region: 1) No 
EU conditionality program, but the country is eligible; 2) Accession conditionality program; 3) 
Stabilization and Association Agreement program (SAA); 4) European Neighborhood Policy 
program (ENP); and 5) No EU conditionality program, but the country is practically ineligible. 
However, in section 3, I explain in greater detail my decision to exclude the EU conditionality 
variables from the statistical test because they would produce multicollinearity in the 
estimation process. 
Economic Development 
Adam Przeworski et al. (2000) have examined systematically the relationship between 
regime type (democratic or authoritarian) and economic performance. As part of the analysis, 
the authors have drawn conclusions about the relationship between the nature of political 
and institutional arrangements and the corresponding levels of economic development. 
Although Przeworski et al.’s (2000: 163) analysis is more sophisticated and nuanced than 
earlier modernization accounts, it contends in essence that “poor countries cannot afford a 
strong state.” Poor countries often lack the administrative and monetary resources to engage 
in long-term development programs and are particularly vulnerable to the implementation of 
partial reforms that benefit only the rulers (Chaudhry 1994; Brownbridge et al. 1998). 
Following the logic of the economic development argument, we should expect predominantly 
wealthy countries in the post-communist region to pursue extensive banking sector 
liberalization. 
Hypothesis 9: The more economically developed the country, the more banking sector 
liberalization. I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 9 
2. Data and Operationalization 
To evaluate banking sector reform, I use benchmarks identified as “best practices.” The 
literature has demonstrated that in the banking sphere it is desirable to: 
-  provide clear market entry and exit conditions (Kroszner 1998; Fries 2005); 
-  ensure the ability of banks to function without excessive state intervention in 
their decision-making (Berglöf and Bolton 2002; Fries 2005); 
-  guarantee central bank independence (Cukierman 1992; Eijffinger and De 
Haan 1996; Maxfield 1998; Epstein 2006; Johnson 2006); 
-  and establish independent banking oversight (Nord 2000). 
Those are key policy standards, according to which I judge a country’s banking sector 
framework at any given time point. International actors such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been adamant proponents of the so-called 
“Washington consensus”
2 policies in the region, including in the realm of banking sector 
reform. Thus the benchmark liberalization reforms in my analysis inevitably reflect 
international pressure to adopt “best practices” used in advanced industrialized economies 
such as introducing more competition in the sector, streamlining bankruptcy procedures, and 
strengthening the central bank and bank supervision. 
The analysis employs a measure of banking reform developed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that takes into account the policy benchmarks 
listed above. As described in Appendix I, the scale of this variable comprises 11 categories 
and ranges from 1 to 4.3, where 1 indicates little progress in banking sector reform beyond 
establishing a two-tier banking system and 4 indicates the presence of institutions that 
ensure competition in the sector, effective prudential supervision, liberalization of interest 
rates and credit allocation, and deepening of financial intermediation (EBRD 2005). For the 
purposes of my analysis, the 11 categories provide a sufficient range and gradation to treat 
this variable as continuous rather than ordinal. 
I use a dataset developed by Klaus Armingeon and Romana Careja (2005) to code the 
partisanship of the governing political parties in the region. Substantively, my analysis yields 
                                                       
2 Developed for Latin American countries in the late 1980s, the “Washington Consensus” policy package was 
subsequently extended to other transitional countries, including the post-communist states (Williamson 2003; Ortiz 
2003: 15). It has generated much controversy after countries that implemented the prescribed policies were hit by 
major economic crises such as the “Tequila Crisis” in Mexico in 1994–1995 and the financial crisis in Argentina in 
2001. John Williamson (1994) has outlined ten policy objectives of the “Washington Consensus”: fiscal discipline; 
reorientation of public expenditure; tax reform (broadening the tax base and cutting marginal rates); financial 
liberalization (ending interest rate controls); unified and competitive exchange rates; trade liberalization (reducing 
tariffs and eliminating non-trade barriers); liberalization of foreign investment; privatization; deregulation; and 
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hypotheses about the impact of the liberal/right and left partisan categories from the 
Armingeon and Careja dataset. I use the year of joining the Socialist International as a proxy 
for the switching point between being an unreformed or reformed left post-communist party. 
The Socialist International is an international alliance of Social Democratic parties. It would 
not admit left parties from the post-communist region as full members unless they prove their 
democratic credentials, minimize their vulnerability to corruption and clientelism, and break 
from their authoritarian past (Socialist International 2001). Appendix I provides detailed 
descriptions of all variables in my model, the coding, and the data sources. 
To detect the presence of a strong clientelistic relationship between the governing elites and 
rent-seeking domestic stakeholders, I use a composite variable developed by Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006) at the World Bank that taps into the 
presence of corruption in the domestic political system. Although corruption is not a perfect 
measure for the extent of clientelism, it is a good proxy used in the political economy 
literature. As Guillermo Rosas (2006: 178) has pointed out, it is reasonable to expect that 
where corruption is low, the chances that politicians, bankers, and enterprise managers will 
be enmeshed in clientelistic relationships will also be low, and vice versa. 
I operationalize the role of foreign investors in two ways. First, I analyze the effect of the 
aggregate inflow of FDI as percentage of the country’s GDP. Second, I include a measure of 
the assets of foreign-owned banks as a percentage of the total banking sector assets in the 
country. To operationalize the trade hypothesis, I use the percentage of trade with 
industrialized countries from a country’s total trade flows. All three variables are lagged by 
one year in the model to avoid endogeneity. The analysis incorporates a set of dummy 
variables to control for the constitutional set-up of post-communist states. The coding is 
based on the Armingeon and Careja (2005) dataset. I coded the four IMF conditionality 
programs based on the Fund’s (2001) reports. The data concerning the amount of IMF 
funding was obtained from the World Bank’s “Global Development Finance” reports (1999, 
2005). 
I use several indicators that tap into a country’s level of economic development. A country’s 
GDP per capita is a widely-used measure of economic development that I incorporate in the 
model. I use annual change in GDP to control for the health of the economy. Because the 
literature has found a curvilinear effect of GDP growth, I also included a square term for the 
annual change in GDP. In addition, my analysis employs a measure of the country’s stock 
market capitalization as a percentage of its GDP. This variable is commonly used to 
distinguish between coordinated market economies and liberal market economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001: 8), but in post-communist states stock market capitalization gauges the 
strength of the emerging financial sector. I also consider the potential effects of a large 
agricultural sector and a strong industrial sector, both measured as percentage of GDP. We 
expect a large agricultural sector to indicate a low level of economic development. A strong 
industrial sector could indicate a high level of economic development, but in the post-I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 11 
communist context, it could also indicate that the economy is not very diversified and much 
of the GDP is generated by the remnants of the big state-owned industrial conglomerates 
from the previous regime. The EBRD has refined its coding procedure starting in 1997. 
Therefore, I include a dummy variable to check for the potential effects of coding refinement. 
Table 1 below  presents a succinct description of the variables included in the final 
specification of the model and the hypothesized effects.  12 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S 
Table 1: Description of the variables and hypothesized effects for the analysis of banking 
sector reform in the post-communist region    
Variable Description  Hypo-
thesis 
Dependent variable     
  EBRD Banking reform  Score  measures  progress  in  liberalization  and 
adopting “best practices” in the banking sector. 
Scale: 1 to 4.3 
 
Explanatory variables     
Domestic politics 
Government partisanship 
   
  Reformed left in government  Scored 1 if reformed left party in government;  
0 if other party in power. 
+ 
  Unreformed left in government  Scored 1 if unreformed left party in government; 
0 if other party in power. 
- 
  Liberal/right in government  Scored 1 if liberal/right party in government; 
0 if other party in power. 
+ 
Domestic stakeholders     
  Lack of corruption  Composite expert survey score. Scale -2.5 to 2.5  + 
  Foreign direct investment  Inflow of FDI as percentage of GDP. Included in the 
model using a moving average formula. 
+ 
  Foreign-owned bank assets  Assets of foreign-owned bank as percentage of total 
bank assets. Scale 0 to 1 
+ 
  Trade with industrialized countries  Trade  with  advanced  industrialized  countries  as 
percentage of total trade flows. Lagged 1 year. 
Scale 0 to 1 
+ 
Constitutional set-up     
    Presidential  system  Dummy variable coded 1 for presidential political 
systems, all other=0. 
- 
  Semi-presidential system, 
  dominated by president 
Semi-presidential political system, where president 
is dominant=1, all other=0 
+ 
  Parliamentary system  Parliamentary political system=1, all other=0  + 
International conditionality     
  No IMF program  Dummy variable coded 1 when the country has no 
agreement with the IMF, all other=0 
- 
  Stand-by agreement with IMF  Stand-by agreement with IMF=1, all other=0  + 
  Poverty relief and growth facility 
  agreement with IMF 
Poverty relief and growth facility agreement with 
IMF=1, all other=0 
 
+ 
  No IMF program and reform front- 
  runner 
No IMF program (and reform front-runner)=1, all 
other=0 
 
none 
  Inflow of IMF funding  Total funding received from the IMF expressed as 
percentage of GDP. Scale 0 to 1 
+ 
Economic development     
  GDP per capita  GDP per capita in thousands USD  + 
  GDP growth  Annual change in GDP in percentages. Scale 0 to 1  + 
  Stock market capitalization  Stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. 
Scale 0 to 1 
+ 
  Percentage non-performing loans  Non-performing loans as percentage of total loans. 
Scale 0 to 1 
+ 
  Percentage of GDP from industry  Percentage of GDP that comes from industry. 
Scale 0 to 1 
+ or -  
  Percentage of GDP from agriculture  Percentage of GDP that comes from agriculture. 
Scale 0 to 1 
- 
Coding refinement  Dummy variable scored 1 for period 1997-2005, 
scored 0 for period 1995-1996. 
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3. Estimation Procedure, Results, and Discussion 
This article employs time-series cross-section analysis using data from 25 states in the post-
communist region: the Central European states, the Baltic states, the Southeast European 
states, and all post-Soviet states over a period of 11 years, 1995-2005. The EBRD began 
collecting data and reporting its banking reform scores, the dependent variable in this 
analysis, in 1995. That is why this study does not cover the period 1989-1994. From the 
states of ex-Yugoslavia, I have excluded Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro due to 
frequently missing data. In total, the model has 275 observations and the panel is balanced: 
It contains 25 countries and observations on each variable for the 11-year period. The 
literature has shown that using standard OLS estimation on pooled cross-sectional data 
violates several regression model assumptions. For example, it lowers the size of the 
standard errors and artificially increases the significance of the estimated coefficients 
(Ostrom 1978; Sayrs 1989; Hicks 1994). 
To overcome these problems and correct for heteroskedasticity, I follow Nathaniel Beck and 
Jonathan Katz’s (1995) recommendation to use panel-corrected standard errors. I apply a 
Prais-Winsten transformation model specifying a first-order auto-regressive process and a 
common  rho  for all cross-sections to amend for the serial correlation in the data. This 
technique has been advocated by Thomas Plümper, Vera Troeger, and Philip Manow (2005) 
as an estimation strategy that in most cases allows researchers to test substantive 
theoretical propositions more accurately than models that employ a lagged dependent 
variable or fixed country effects. I have chosen not to include a lagged dependent variable in 
the model specification in light of Christopher Achen’s (2000: 13) analysis demonstrating that 
a lagged dependent variable “does bias the substantive coefficients toward negligible values 
and does artificially inflate the effect of the lagged dependent variable.” In my dataset, the 
year-to-year changes in countries’ evaluation of banking sector liberalization are small. In 
this case, the lagged dependent variable washes out the effect of the other independent 
variables, while substantively it does not contribute to the causal explanation (Nickell 1981; 
Baltagi 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2002). In fact, Beck and Katz (2004: 16-17) have shown that 
correcting for a first-order auto-regressive process deals with the serial correlation problem 
without suppressing the power of the independent variables. 
To evaluate the robustness of the coefficient estimates, I re-estimated the model using a very 
different estimation strategy—fixed effects—even though this technique is not appropriate 
given the goals and data structure in this research project. The results are reported in 
Appendix III. The estimates produced by the fixed effects model are generally in line with 
those obtained from the Prais-Winsten transformation model reported in table 2. At the end 
of this section, I discuss important differences in the estimates derived from the two 
techniques. Why is a fixed effects model not advisable in my case? Plümper et al. (2005: 
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the dependent variable which is due to time-invariant factors such as difference in 
constitutional set-up in my research. Furthermore, the use of fixed effects completely 
absorbs differences in the level of the independent variables across units. As my theoretical 
framework anticipates the existence of such level effects, Plümper et al. (2005: 333) advise 
against the inclusion of country dummies. Several independent variables of interest in my 
model vary mainly across countries, which is another reason why Plümper et al. (2005) 
suggest not to use fixed effects because this procedure would reduce artificially the size of 
the coefficients. 
Before I present and discuss the coefficient estimates, I consider the relationships among 
the explanatory variables in the model. After conducting a variance inflation factor test, 
reported in Appendix IV, I have decided to exclude the measures for EU conditionality from 
the analysis. The variance inflation factor for two of the EU conditionality programs is well 
above 10, which indicates the presence of multicollinearity. Furthermore, countries in the 
post-communist region display significant variation in the degree of economic development, 
transparency, trade integration with the Western economies, and political stability. The data 
shows that the states that have been involved in the strictest and most effective EU 
conditionality program—the Accession Process—are largely the ones with stable liberal 
democratic governments, the highest degree of economic development, trade integration 
with the West, and freedom from corruption. From a theoretical standpoint, it is more 
plausible that the political and economic variables listed above have a causal impact on 
banking sector liberalization, rather than EU conditionality. The kind of conditionality program 
that the EU is likely to offer depends on the target country’s location, degree of political 
stability, and level of economic development. For example, it is not reasonable to expect that 
the EU will offer the accession conditionality package to Belarus or, to stretch this reasoning 
even further, Uzbekistan. Because some countries in the post-communist region by virtue of 
their geographical location are not eligible for the strictest and most effective kind of EU 
conditionality, it becomes problematic to disentangle the flow of causality between the bundle 
of factors that qualify a country to participate in a particular kind of EU conditionality program 
and the independent impact of EU conditionality on the target country. In my view, in-depth 
case study analysis would be a more appropriate method to analyze this dynamic. Additional 
diagnostic tests confirmed that the model has no omitted variables.  
Table 2 presents the results of the time-series cross-section analysis. The model fits the data 
well. The explanatory variables account for 78 percent of the variance in the quality of 
banking sector reform in the post-communist region. The statistically significant positive 
intercept of 2.296 suggests that there is a tendency to introduce some degree of banking 
sector liberalization that is common to all countries in the region. 
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Table 2: Analysis of the determinants of banking sector reform in the post-communist region 
Explanatory variables 
 
 
Effect 
 
 
pcse 
 
 
Implied 
effect 
(coefficient × one 
standard deviation) 
Intercept 
effect 
(dichotomous 
variables) 
Domestic politics 
Government partisanship 
Unreformed left in government  
- baseline category -  
Reformed left in government 
 
 
 
 
.012 
 
 
 
 
(.093) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.308 
Liberal / right in government  .057  (.072)    2.353 
Domestic stakeholders 
Lack of corruption 
 
.178* 
 
(.109) 
 
.120   
Foreign direct investment  (t-1)  .461  (.912)  .024   
Foreign-owned bank assets (t-1) .417***  (.119)  .126   
Trade with industrialized countries(t-1) .226  (.225)  .046   
Constitutional set-up 
Presidential system 
- baseline category -  
Semi-presidential system, 
dominated by president 
 
 
 
 
.052 
 
 
 
 
(.099) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.348 
Parliamentary system  .351**  (.116)    2.647 
International conditionality 
Stand-by agreement with IMF  
- baseline category - 
No IMF agreement 
 
 
 
-.184** 
 
 
 
(.078) 
 
 
 
 
2.112 
Poverty relief and growth facility 
agreement with IMF 
 
-.069 
 
(.069)     
2.227 
No IMF program 
and reform front-runner 
 
.004 
 
(.075)     
2.300 
Inflow of IMF funding (t-1)  1.586*  (.847)  .059   
Economic development 
GDP per capita 
 
.050*** 
 
(.013) 
 
.151   
GDP growth 
GDP growth square 
.394 
-2.561 
(.478) 
(3.360) 
 
.021   
Stock market capitalization  .036*** (.009) .125   
Percentage non-performing loans (t-1)  .105  (.160)  .017   
Percentage of GDP from industry  -1.059**  (.361)  .080   
Percentage of GDP from agriculture  -.877*  (.426)  .089   
Coding refinement 
Unreformed left*corruption 
Liberal/right*corruption 
Unreformed left*FDI 
Reformed left*FDI 
.054 
.029 
.002 
.633 
1.526 
(.068) 
(.090) 
(.099) 
(.882) 
(1.445) 
  
Constant  2.296*** (.222)     
Adjusted R-squared  .783      
275 observations         
AR1 autocorrelation process: rho  .498       
Note: The table presents unstandardized regression coefficients obtained by applying a Prais-Winsten 
transformation model (AR1) with panel-corrected standard errors (pcse) in parentheses. The 
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The coefficients of the reformed left and liberal/right partisanship variables are positive as 
hypothesized. However, the results are not statistically significant. The test of the other 
domestic-level variables supports my argument about the dynamics of partial reform in the 
post-communist region. I use the level of corruption in the political system as a proxy for the 
presence of clientelism that hinders comprehensive banking sector reform. The analysis 
confirms that the less clientelism and corruption are present in the domestic system, the 
more banking sector liberalization, and the result is statistically significant. Because the 
reported coefficients are unstandardized, I have assessed the implied effects of one standard 
deviation move from the mean of the respective independent variable in order to compare 
the size of the effects. Thus one standard deviation increase in the degree of freedom from 
corruption in a political system results in a 0.120-unit increase in the extent of banking sector 
liberalization and reform. A stronger presence of foreign banks is also a statistically 
significant predictor of banking sector liberalization. This variable is lagged for one year in 
the model in order to avoid endogeneity. One standard deviation increase in the share of 
foreign banks’ assets results in a 0.126-unit increase in the extent of banking sector 
liberalization, and the effect is highly statistically significant. Yet a country’s trade profile is 
not a statistically significant predictor of the degree of banking sector liberalization and 
reform. A country’s constitutional set-up also has a statistically significant impact on the 
extent of banking sector liberalization: For parliamentary systems the value of the intercept is 
2.647 and statistically significant. The coefficient of the semi-presidential system variable is 
positive as hypothesized, but it is not statistically significant. 
What are the important findings concerning the impact of international pressures? The 
analysis shows that countries that have not participated in the stricter Stand-by IMF program, 
the baseline category, have undertaken less banking sector liberalization. The value of the 
intercept for those countries is 2.112 and statistically significant. As hypothesized, obtaining 
funding from the IMF creates significant pressures to follow the Fund’s prescriptions and 
introduce more banking sector liberalization. One standard deviation increase in the amount 
of funding that a country has received from the IMF results in a 0.059-unit increase in the 
extent of banking sector liberalization, and the effect is statistically significant. 
Several of the economic development measures in the model are strong and highly 
statistically significant predictors of the extent of banking sector liberalization and reform in 
the region. One standard deviation increase in GDP per capita produces a 0.151-unit 
increase in the extent of banking sector liberalization. The same move in the stock market 
capitalization variable results in a 0.125-unit increase in the EBRD score. However, the 
health of the economy, measured as annual change in GDP, is not statistically significant. A 
higher share of both agriculture and industry in a country’s GDP is associated with a 
statistically significant decrease in the extent of banking sector liberalization. One standard 
deviation increase in the agriculture variable produces a 0.089-unit decrease in the EBRD 
score, and an equivalent move in the industry variable leads to a 0.080-unit decrease in the 
extent of banking sector liberalization. I also test for the presence of interaction effects I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 17 
between partisanship and corruption level and partisanship and the level of foreign direct 
investment, as implied in the domestic alliances argument presented in the theoretical 
section. However, the interaction effects are not statistically significant. 
The coefficient estimates produced by the fixed effects model specification reported in 
Appendix III are generally in line with those obtained from the Prais-Winsten model. 
However, the fixed effects model reveals the presence of significant country differences. For 
several reform ‘front-runners’ such as Hungary the value of the intercept is higher and 
statistically significant—they have pursued more banking sector liberalization—whereas for 
several reform ‘laggards’ such as Turkmenistan the value of the intercept is lower and 
statistically significant—they have implemented less banking sector liberalization. 
As expected based on the discussion of estimation techniques presented earlier, time-
invariant variables such as constitutional set-up and variables with predominantly cross-
sectional variation such as stock market capitalization and percentage of GDP from industry 
and agriculture are no longer significant in the fixed effects model. A Hausman test 
performed to evaluate whether the coefficients obtained from a fixed effects model are 
systematically different from those obtained from a random effects model was not significant. 
This suggests that the fixed effects are not correlated with the predictors and it is acceptable 
to apply Prais-Winsten and random effects specifications rather than a fixed effects model in 
order to test the research hypotheses presented in this article.   18 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S 
Conclusion 
This article has investigated which political and economic factors have pushed post-
communist governments to pursue banking sector liberalization and reform. Factors from all 
three theoretical frameworks—domestic politics, international pressures, and economic 
development—turn out to be substantively important and statistically significant predictors of 
the extent of banking sector liberalization and reform, which suggests the presence of a 
complex conjunctural causal pattern. We have seen that variables that explain institutional 
and policy change in advanced industrialized states matter in the post-communist context as 
well, but in addition structural factors are very important determinants of banking sector 
liberalization in the region. On the domestic level, the analysis has confirmed that the higher 
the presence of foreign banks, the more banking sector liberalization. Curbing corruption is 
also strongly related to more banking sector liberalization, and so is the choice of a 
parliamentary constitutional set-up over a presidential one. On the international level, 
exposure to stricter IMF conditionality in terms of a Stand-by agreement has a positive effect 
on the extent of banking sector liberalization. The analysis has confirmed the importance of 
structural factors: Measures of economic development such as GDP per capita and stock 
market capitalization are highly statistically significant predictors of the extent of banking 
sector liberalization. 
As a possible direction for further research, case study analyses of banking sector 
liberalization in the region could illuminate better the causal mechanisms, sequencing 
patterns, and interplay between the important explanatory factors, thus contributing to our 
deeper understanding of institutional change. In light of the finding that structural factors are 
very important in banking sector liberalization and reform, it is worthwhile to investigate the 
extent to which initial economic conditions influence the types of domestic stakeholders who 
are mobilized and motivated to influence policy-making. I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 19 
Appendices 
I. Description of the Variables, Coding, and Data Sources 
Variables Included in the Final Model Specification 
Quality of Banking Reform 
ebrd_banking: The quality of banking reform variable measures progress in adopting banking 
regulations such as bankruptcy laws and guarantees for Central Bank independence. The scale 
runs from the lowest score (=1) to the highest score (=4.3). Overall, the scale comprises 11 
categories: Scores such as 2.3 or 3.7 are possible and occur in the EBRD dataset. The following 
qualitative description of the four main scores is taken from the EBRD methodology report. 
1= Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier banking system.  
2= Significant liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed 
credit or interest rate ceilings.  
3= Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential 
supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalization with little preferential access to 
cheap refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence of 
private banks.  
4= Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS (Bank for International 
Settlements) standards; well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential 
supervision; significant term lending to private enterprises; substantial financial deepening.  
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2005. “EBRD Transition 
indicators by country.” In Transition Report 2005: Business in Transition. 
Available at: <http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm>. 
Government Partisanship 
The party in government and its party family (i.e. reformed left, unreformed left, and 
liberal/right) are coded using the Armingeon et al. dataset. The distinction between reformed 
and unreformed left for the communist successor parties in the region is established by 
taking the year of joining the Socialist International as a switching point. 
unref_left: Unreformed left in government=1, all other=0 
ref_left: Reformed left in government=1, all other=0 
liberal_right: Liberal/right in government=1, all other=0 
Source: Armingeon, K. and Careja, R. Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist 
Countries, 1989-2005, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne, 2005. 20 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S 
The Socialist International website <http://www.socialistinternational.org/main.html> 
Minutes from voting in the Socialist International Congresses after 1989. 
Available at: <http://www.socialistinternational.org/5Congress/previous-e.html>. 
Domestic Stakeholders 
corruption: Lack of corruption 
This variable is a composite score based on expert surveys obtained from different 
organizations. It taps into public trust in the honesty of politicians; frequency of making extra 
payments in order to “get things done”; percentage of government officials, judges, and 
elected leaders involved in corruption. 
The scale runs from the lowest score (= –2.5) to the highest score (=2.5) 
Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2006. Governance Matters V: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2005. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. 
fdi_gdp: Inflow of foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
foreign_owned: Assets of foreign-owned bank as percentage of the total  assets in the 
banking system. 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
Source for both indicators above: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
2005. “EBRD Transition indicators by country.” In Transition Report 2005: Business in 
Transition.  
trade_industrialized:  Percentage trade with industrialized countries from the total 
trade flows. 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 1999-2004. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. 
Washington, D.C.: IMF Publication Services. 
Constitutional Set-up 
pres:   Presidential political system=1, all other=0 
semi-pres:   Semi-presidential political system, where president is dominant=1, all 
other=0 
parl:   Parliamentary political system=1, all other=0 
Source for the three indicators above: Armingeon, K. and Careja, R. Comparative Data Set 
for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2005, Institute of Political Science, University of 
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Conditionality 
imf_no_agreement: No IMF agreement=1, all other=0 
imf_standby: Stand-by agreement with IMF=1, all other=0 
imf_prgf: Poverty relief and growth facility agreement with IMF=1, all other=0 
imf_frontrunner: No IMF program (and reform front-runner)=1, all other=0 
Source: IMF Members’ Financial Data by Country Database. 
Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin1.aspx>. 
imf_funding: This variable represents the inflow of IMF funding as percentage of the 
country’s GDP. 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from The World Bank. 1997, 1999, and 2005. 
Global Development Finance. Washington D.C.: The World Bank Publications Department. 
Economic Development 
gdp_pc: GDP per capita, in thousands of USD 
gdp_growth: Annual change in GDP, in percentages. 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
stk_mkt: Stock market capitalization as percentage of GDP 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
nonperf_loans: Non-performing loans as percentage of total loans for the particular year. 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
agri: Percentage of GDP from agriculture 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
industry: Percentage of GDP from industry 
The scale runs from the lowest score (=0) to the highest score (=1) 
Source for all four indicators above: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
2005. “EBRD Transition indicators by country.” In Transition Report 2005: Business in 
Transition.  
coding: The coding of the EBRD banking reform variable became more nuanced starting 
1997. This is a dummy variable coded by the author to capture any effects of the coding 
improvement. The variable=1 for the period 1997-2005 and =0 for the period 1995 and 1996 22 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S 
Variables Excluded from the Final Model Specification 
EU Conditionality  
eu1: No EU conditionality program, but eligible=1, all other=0 
eu2: Accession conditionality program=1, all other=0 
eu3: Stabilization and Association Agreement program=1, all other=0 
eu4: European Neighborhood Policy program=1, all other=0  
eu5: No EU conditionality program, and ineligible=1, all other=0 
Source:  Author’s coding based on the information available at the official website of the 
European Union: <http://europa.eu/index_en.htm>. 
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II. Summary Statistics of the Variables in the Model 
 
 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Min 
 
Max 
EBRD banking reform  275  2.552  .778  1  4 
Domestic politics 
Government coloration         
Unreformed left in government 
- baseline category -   275 .36  .481  0  1 
Reformed left in government  275  .164  .371  0  1 
Liberal / right in government  275  .287  .453  0  1 
Domestic stakeholders 
Lack of corruption 
 
275 
 
-.405 
 
.673 
 
-1.76 
 
1.15 
Foreign direct investment (t-1)  250  .047  .052  .001  .451 
Foreign-owned bank assets (t-1)  250  .327  .301  0  .98 
Trade with industrialized 
countries (t-1) 
 
250 
 
.484 
 
.203 
 
.08 
 
.888 
Constitutional set-up 
Presidential system 
- baseline category -  
Semi-presidential system, 
dominated by president 
 
275 
 
 
275 
 
.2 
 
 
.258 
 
.401 
 
 
.438 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
Parliamentary system  275  .542  .499  0  1 
International conditionality 
Stand-by agreement with IMF 
- baseline category -  
No IMF agreement 
 
275 
 
275 
 
.415 
 
.175 
 
.494 
 
.380 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
Poverty relief and growth facility 
agreement with IMF 
 
275 
 
.207 
 
.406 
 
0 
 
1 
No IMF program 
and reform front-runner 
 
275 
 
.204 
 
.403 
 
0 
 
1 
Inflow of IMF funding (t-1)  250  .032  .037  0  .159 
Economic development 
GDP per capita 
 
275 
 
2.902 
 
3.012 
 
.114 
 
17.263 
GDP growth 
GDP growth square 
275 
275 
.046 
.005 
.053 
.006 
-.13 
0 
.243 
.059 
Stock market capitalization  275 .332  3.477 -9.21  4.275 
Percentage non-performing loans (t-1)  250  .163  .162  0  .912 
Percentage of GDP from industry  275  .254  .076  .071  .574 
Percentage of GDP from agriculture  275  .143  .102  .025  .463 
Coding refinement  275  .818  .386  0  1 24 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S 
III. Model Estimation Using Fixed Effects 
Explanatory variables 
 
Effect 
 
Standard 
error 
Domestic politics 
Government partisanship 
Unreformed left in government  
- baseline category -  
Reformed left in government  .100  (.105) 
Liberal / right in government  .227**  (.074) 
Domestic stakeholders 
Lack of corruption  .151* (.091) 
Foreign direct investment  (t-1)  .154  (.774) 
Foreign-owned bank assets (t-1)  .195*  (.091) 
Trade with industrialized countries(t-1)  .108  (.286) 
Constitutional set-up 
Presidential system 
- baseline category -  
Semi-presidential system, 
dominated by president  -.214 (.220) 
Parliamentary system  -.034  (.170) 
International conditionality 
Stand-by agreement with IMF  
- baseline category - 
No IMF agreement  .050  (.064) 
Poverty relief and growth facility 
agreement with IMF 
 
.112 
 
(.076) 
No IMF program 
and reform front-runner  -.015  (.086) 
Inflow of IMF funding (t-1)  -.289  (.980) 
Economic development 
GDP per capita  .083***  (.016) 
GDP growth 
GDP growth square 
1.019* 
-5.145 
(.483) 
(3.890) 
Stock market capitalization  -.004 (.013) 
Percentage non-performing loans (t-1)  .162  (.140) 
Percentage of GDP from industry  .059  (.584) 
Percentage of GDP from agriculture  -1.017  (.587) 
Coding refinement 
Unreformed left*corruption 
Liberal/right*corruption 
Unreformed left*FDI 
Reformed left*FDI 
.062 
-.148 
.102 
.232 
1.492 
(.057) 
(.098) 
(.099) 
(.913) 
(1.463) 
Constant  2.187*** (.186) 
R-squared 
275 observations 
 
overall 
within 
between 
.609 
.488 
.630   
 
sigma-u 
sigma-e 
rho 
.484 
.210 
.842   
 
Note: The significance levels are as follows: *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001, one-tailed test. I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 25 
IV. Variance Inflation Factor Analysis to Detect 
Multicollinearity 
Model specification including the EU program participation dummy variables. 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         eu2 |     20.41    0.048986 
        parl |     17.36    0.057587 
         eu5 |     12.64    0.079125 
  corruption |      6.90    0.144879 
trade_lagged |      5.89    0.169899 
      gdp_pc |      4.78    0.209030 
        agri |      4.73    0.211491 
         eu3 |      4.20    0.238095 
 log_stk_mkt |      4.02    0.248714 
   semi_pres |      3.66    0.273035 
imf_frontr~r |      3.35    0.298951 
liberal_ri~t |      3.19    0.313340 
    imf_prgf |      3.03    0.329966 
    ref_left |      2.94    0.340063 
 gdp_growth2 |      2.89    0.346504 
foreign_~ged |      2.81    0.356447 
         eu1 |      2.76    0.362788 
imf_fundin~d |      2.72    0.366974 
    industry |      2.61    0.383230 
  gdp_growth |      2.53    0.394969 
imf_no_agr~t |      2.01    0.498470 
nonperf_lo~d |      1.79    0.558763 
      coding |      1.50    0.665117 
  fdi_lagged |      1.40    0.712972 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      5.01 
 
Model specification excluding the EU program participation dummy variables. 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
        parl |      8.16    0.122582 
  corruption |      6.39    0.156465 
      gdp_pc |      4.64    0.215609 
        agri |      4.55    0.219614 
trade_lagged |      4.45    0.224584 
   semi_pres |      3.55    0.282084 
 log_stk_mkt |      3.47    0.287963 
imf_frontr~r |      3.05    0.328089 
liberal_ri~t |      3.04    0.328544 
 gdp_growth2 |      2.83    0.352925 
    ref_left |      2.79    0.359058 
    imf_prgf |      2.70    0.370114 
  gdp_growth |      2.51    0.398910 
    industry |      2.35    0.424764 
imf_fundin~d |      2.15    0.464203 
foreign_~ged |      2.13    0.469047 
imf_no_agr~t |      1.90    0.526560 
nonperf_lo~d |      1.65    0.606223 
  fdi_lagged |      1.37    0.727615 
      coding |      1.34    0.746505 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      3.25 26 — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — I H S I H S — Aneta B. Spendzharova / Banking Sector Liberalization and Reform after 1989 — 27 
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